What Are Scientific Controversies

At first glance, scientific controversies are simply disagreements among the practitioners of a given science regarding some aspect of their practice. They are disagreements over the way to tackle a given problem or puzzle, over what an adequate solution to such a problem or puzzle amounts to, or even over the criteria to be employed for such an assessment. A scientific controversy, however, is not a mere disagreement: it is one that cannot be readily settled by resorting to the commonly accepted disciplinary canons for conducting the relevant inquiry, as these have been developed up to that time. The disagreement may even be profound enough to implicate the assessment of those very canons. As the reader should have gathered by now, my main thesis is that scientific controversies occur when disagreeing scientists do not share background “assumptions.”

Let me elaborate somewhat on this. First of all, background “assumptions” exist inescapably, as noted above, in any process of inquiry while such a process is addressed to the world that exists independently of it and of the background “assumptions” it involves. This is to say that the world need not conform to what these “assumptions” silently dictate, while the resistance it may correspondingly manifest appears in the form of a problem, or puzzle, which the inquiry in question cannot solve or dissolve, at least for the moment (Baltas 1997). Beyond the manifestation of such a resistance, the world remains, however, mute: it cannot point out by itself which of the “assumptions” involved are at fault. Thus, in front of a problem or puzzle that dumbly resists its resolution with the means at hand, those conducting the inquiry have to resort to some strategy of their own design for coping with the situation. In some occasions, different such strategies may seem to different scientists as worth pursuing.

Now, each such strategy is an inquiry in its own right, involving its own set of background “assumptions.” Background “assumptions” derive, as I implied above, from the positions in the widest possible sense (social, professional, ideological, etc.) of the scientists implicated. That different such sets of background “assumptions,” and hence that different such strategies, are in principle available derives from the fact that these positions constitute an indefinitely rich variety. That these strategies are different implies that the “assumptions” they involve are not shared. As background “assumptions” are not proper assumptions, explicitly stated and overtly accepted, their precise role and function regarding the strategy they determine remain hidden from view. This is to say that, in pursuing their different strategies, scientists are constrained by something they do not share and are in no position to lay bare on the table of discussion. Their disagreement amounts to a controversy because they debate an issue without rendering explicit the very factors whose silent existence precludes their all resorting at the same moment and in the same manner to the same set of criteria, norms, or canons.

If this is indeed what a scientific controversy amounts to, the general pattern of its resolution should run as follows. First of all, one of the parties implicated, while pursuing its particular strategy, must come up with a new scientific result that solves— or at least appears to solve—the problem and/or dissolves the puzzle lying at the root of the controversy. On the basis of what I have said, it follows that the new scientific result achieves this to the extent, and only to the extent, that its coming to being effects the disclosure of one (or more) of the background “assumptions” that had been silently at work during the controversy. However, this may not be immediately sufficient in itself to end the controversy. The other parties implicated need not acknowledge that the new result indeed achieves what the first party claims, and the controversy may linger. Our analysis of background “assumptions” permits us to isolate the grammatical condition—as opposed to the merely sociological and/or psychological—that will allow the new result eventually to win the day, such resistance notwithstanding.

The disclosure of an background “assumption” accomplishes simultaneously two things. On the one hand, it adds new grammatical possibilities to the conceptual system of the corresponding science: for the party having effected the disclosure, the horizon of inquiry is no longer closed by the mute existence of this “assumption,” and new avenues of research are thus opened. These will eventually lead to the establishment of additional scientific results. On the other hand, the disclosure creates a new vantage point from where the party in question can look back at the particulars of the controversy. The misconstruals due to the work that the disclosed “assumption” had been silently performing, and had prevented the new scientific result from being attained before, can thus be located. The existence of additional scientific results, in conjunction with the localization of the previous misconstruals, places the party whose strategy was successful in this manner at an objectively superior position (Baltas 1992) regarding its opponents, who continue to be blinded by the work mutely performed by the “assumption” in question, and arms him or her with important rhetorical ammunition. By employing such ammunition the party who has effected the disclosure will make his or her point of view prevail in the longer or shorter run.

Given that different “levels” of background “assumptions” can be distinguished, it follows that scientific controversies can be classified according to those “levels.” However, I should stress that the existence of a background “assumption,” its particular “level,” and the role it effectively plays at any juncture of a science’s development can be determined only ex post facto, after the “assumption” has been disclosed and from the new vantage point created by this disclosure. In other words, it is impossible to arbitrate a scientific controversy before such a disclosure has been effected and/or from a vantage point that pretends to remain neutral regarding the two parties implicated, namely, the one who has effected the disclosure and the one who continues to be blinded by its silent existence.